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Abstract
Internalization, the process by which culture becomes mind, is a core concept in cul-
tural psychology. However, since the 1990s it has also been the source of debate.
Critiques have focused on the underlying metaphor of internal-external as problematic.
It has been proposed that appropriation provides a better conceptualization, a term that
focuses attention more on behavior and less on psychological processes. The present
article reviews the debate and introduces the recent concepts of position exchange and
symbolic resources. Position exchange focuses on the societal side of culture, on the
way in which social situations shape people’s experiences. Symbolic resources focus on
culture in terms of specific elements, such as books, films, and so on, which also shape
people’s experiences. The key idea common to both position exchange and symbolic
resources is that people move through culture, both physically and psychologically.
Moving through culture shapes a series of experiences across the lifecourse, and
these experiences ‘‘layer up’’ within individuals, forming a complex sedimentation of
culture within individuals. In so far as culture is heterogeneous and fragmented, so the
sedimented layers of experience will also be heterogeneous and fragmented, thus
creating the tensions that underlie the dynamics of mind.
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When Culture & Psychology was established in 1995 (Valsiner, 1995), a key debate
in the ﬁeld was between internalization and appropriation. Should culture be
conceptualized as something that moves into the individual, constituting their psy-
chological life? Or should culture be conceptualized as a practice, something that
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one becomes skilled in? A second debate came about when internalization started
to appear as a passive process, not accounting for psychological development and
the emergence of novelty. We revisit these debates with the beneﬁt of 20 years
hindsight. After outlining the terms of these debates, we then show how the
recent concepts of symbolic resources and position exchange can enrich our under-
standing of internalization. We conclude by presenting an integrative model that
moves beyond individual-culture relations, by including a consideration of how
cultural elements structure psychological experience, a consideration of the wider
societal structure that shapes individual experience, and a lifecourse perspective
that looks at internalization and appropriation as part of development across the
lifecourse.
The internalization debates
The concept of internalization became popular through the 1978 publication of
Vygotsky’s work Mind in Society edited and translated by Michael Cole and col-
leagues. In that work, Vygotsky and his editors describe the process of internal-
ization in terms of three transformations:
a. An operation that initially represents an external activity is reconstructed
internally. Of particular importance to the development of higher mental pro-
cesses is the transformation of sign-using activity, the history and characteris-
tics of which are illustrated by the development of practical intelligence,
voluntary attention, and memory.
b. An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one. Every func-
tion in the child’s cultural development appears twice; ﬁrst, on the social level,
and later, on the individual level; ﬁrst, between people (interpsychological), and
then inside the child (intrapsychological) [. . .]
c. The internalization of cultural forms of behavior involves the reconstruction of
psychological activity on the basis of sign operations. [. . .] The internalization
of socially rooted and historically developed activities is the distinguishing fea-
ture of human psychology, the basis of the qualitative leap from animal to
human psychology. As yet, the barest outline of this process is known.
(Vygotsky, 1978, pp. 57–58).
According to this account, operations, social interactions, and culture are inter-
nalized. However, how these originally external phenomena are actually interna-
lized remains unclear. Indeed, in the 1990s it was still the case that ‘‘the barest
outline of this process is known’’. This lack of clarity fostered debate. After the
collapse of communism in 1991 and coinciding with new translations (i.e. Thought
and language in 1986 (Vygotsky, 1986), and the ﬁrst volumes of the collected
works), the process of internalization received critical scrutiny (Van der Veer &
Yasnitsky, 2011). The ensuing debate also took place as cultural psychology was
expanding as a ﬁeld (Bruner, 1990; Cole, 1996; Valsiner, 1987; Wertsch, 1991), in
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dialog with other disciplines (such as anthropology, semiotics, and cognitive sci-
ences) and the translation of other soviet psychologists (see for instance Arievitch
& van der Veer, 1995), with the result being an emergence of sub-groups within the
ﬁeld, such as cultural-historical activity theory, approaches centered on community
of practices, distributed cognition, and more semiotic approaches.
The initial critique was that internalization was very general and ‘‘not suﬃcient
for elaborated theoretical use, nor is it helpful in deriving empirical research meth-
odologies’’ (Lawrence & Valsiner, 1993, p. 191). This generality gave way to two
more speciﬁc problems and debates: ﬁrst, does it accurately conceptualize inter-
actions between mind and culture? And second, does it suﬃciently explain how new
ideas emerge, how development comes to be, and how people contribute to social
change?
1. Internalization vs appropriation: The inside-outside fallacy
The ﬁrst debate centered on the spatial metaphor implied by the notion of
internalization (Wertsch 1993), namely, the sharp metaphorical distinction between
that which is external to the individual and that which is internal to the individual
(Lakoﬀ & Johnson, 1980). The problem is that the concept traverses the major
tensions in psychology, across the divide between mind and matter, and across the
divide between the individual and society. To raise the question of how culture
moves from the outside to the inside potentially separates mind from the world,
reifying it. Thus there was a concern that the concept of internalization would lead
cultural psychologists backward, into philosophical debates about the ontological
status of mind. Accordingly, Rogoﬀ proposed replacing the concept of internal-
ization with that of ‘‘appropriation’’ (1993, 1995):
I use the term ‘‘participatory appropriation’’ (or simply ‘‘appropriation’’) to refer to
the process by which individuals transform their understanding of and responsibil-
ity for activities through their own participation. [. . .] The basic idea of appropriation
is that, through participation, people change and in the process become prepared
to engage in subsequent similar activities. By engaging in an activity, participating
in its meaning, people necessarily make ongoing contributions (whether in con-
crete actions or in stretching to understand the actions and ideas of others). [. . .]
Rather than viewing the process as one of internalization in which something static
is taken across a boundary from the external to the internal, I see children’s active
participation itself as being the process by which they gain facility in an activity.
(Rogoﬀ, 1995)
The concept appropriation bypasses the inside/outside metaphor, emphasizing the
activity of the person within their situated social context. This activity within a
context is observable and unproblematic. Moreover, in the progressive mastery of
an activity one can study how the individual becomes a competent cultural actor; in
short, no claims about internalizing culture are necessary.
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The problem with Rogoﬀ’s (1995) argument is that, ﬁrst, it is based on a restrict-
ive understanding of Vygotsky, and second, it eliminates psychological develop-
ment. This approach turns an epistemological principle (i.e. development is socially
situated and mediated and thus the mind in inherently social) into an ontological
one, namely, that the ‘‘mind’’ either does not exist or is not relevant. Put somewhat
bluntly, this approach seems to resolve the internal/external tension by focusing
exclusively on one side of the debate (i.e. the external). This approach avoids
confronting the philosophical issue of how the mind is related to the world, and
in the process it overlooks the empirical phenomenon of mind.
Valsiner and Lawrence (1997) resisted dissolving the psychological into the con-
cept of participation, arguing for a semiotic understanding of internalization; it is
not things from the world that come into the mind, but meanings, that is, making
sense of the world. Meanings guided by social interactions, cultural artifacts, and
institutions can be reconstructed as meanings in the mind. Internalization becomes
a socially guided, culturally enabled psychological process. Understanding intern-
alization as a semiotic dynamic reveals how the person can, in turn, bring new
meanings to the world, namely, by the symmetric process of externalization.
Internalization and externalization involve reciprocal cyclical processes by which the
person operates on semiotic material, the signs that stand for the objects and events
within the meanings the collective-culture constructs and uses to represent its realties.
By ‘internalization’, we understand the process by which meanings that are held out
for the individual by social structures and social others are brought over into the
individual’s thinking. This process of bringing over meanings is bi-directional (from
outer to inner world, and back), and constructive. What originally had collective-
cultural meaning in the inter-personal (or inter-mental) domain, under the guidance
of socially shared interpretations of reality becomes intra-personal (intra-mental)
(Lawrence & Valsiner, 1993). This transposition occurs during social interactions,
for example, when two persons are engaged in dyadic problem solving, during expli-
citly teaching episode, or implicitly while persons engage in the normal activities of
life. The reciprocal process of ‘externalization’ connotes activities in the injection back
into the social environment of material that once was social in character and had
become personal. (Lawrence & Valsiner, 1997, p. 95)
Focusing thedebateuponmeaningandexternalizationwasa signiﬁcant contribution.
However, this redeﬁnition of internalization as bidirectional semiotic process still does
not account for the fact that internalization might lead to the psychological creation of
authentic new ideas. For this, a more elaborated model needs to be developed—intern-
alization is not only a circulation, it is also construction and integration.
2. Internalization as reproduction vs. development
This second debate was addressed by Aaro Toomela (1996) in the pages of
Culture & Psychology. After reviewing the internalization debate, Toomela
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argued that the co-construction argument of Lawrence and Valsiner (1993) ‘‘does
not explain why it is necessary for human to develop in the socio-cultural environ-
ment; and how a developmental transformation of mind takes place’’ (Toomela,
1996, p. 286). His starting working deﬁnition was:
Internalization is a process whereby two diﬀerent mechanisms of information
processing, non-verbal (‘sensory’) thinking and conventional language, that have been
diﬀerentiated from the ‘natural’ processes in the course of development become united
within a new mental structure. The result of internalization is the development of
semiotically mediated, ‘cultural’ mental operations. (Toomela, 1996, p. 286, emphasis
original)
What is interesting about Toomela’s conceptualization of internalization is that it
entails the combination of two streams, the sensory and the linguistic, in the emer-
gence of new mental structures. The paper then develops the notions of structure
(made of elements in a dynamic relation), dynamic development, related to it,
natural vs. cultural processes, and semiotic mediation, before analytically charac-
terizing internalization in terms of the following properties:
1. Internalization is a structural change. That is to say, internalization is a process
whereby elements that are not connected, or even are not diﬀerentiated from the
lower order structures at the beginning of the development, will be united within
a more complex structure.
2. Elements that create a new structure are an environment and a developing
person [. . .] For the development of internalization, a person must possess
innate abilities that allow perception of the environment; and the environment
must be social.
3. The social nature of the developmental environment is necessary for the diﬀer-
entiation of symbolic operations from other kinds of relationships between
objects and persons. The diﬀerentiation leads to the acquisition of two diﬀerent
mechanisms for processing the same information.
4. The result of the internalization is a semiotically mediated mental process.
Semiotically mediated process is a speciﬁc kid of mental structure where
(sensory) information is processed by two diﬀerent but structurally connected
mechanisms, that of non-verbal thinking and that of symbolic operations.
With the construction of such new structures—‘‘cultural’’ processes—a qualita-
tive new type of thinking operations is acquired. It becomes possible
intra-individually to create novel information and go beyond directly observable
facts which can be perceived through a sensory system (Toomela, 1996,
pp. 297–298).
Toomela’s dynamic, structural, semiotic understanding of internalization allows
for more ﬁne-grained analysis of human development. It goes far beyond the
inside/outside fallacy and deepens the semiotic analysis of internalization by
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adding a structural basis, anchorage in the organization of the social environment,
and a diﬀerentiation within the psychological processes involved. Through these
additions, Toomela created a heuristic notion that accounts for internalization as
developmental process.
Within the past 20 years, the ﬁeld of cultural psychology splits on this issue. The
concept of internalization as appropriation was accepted by some researchers;
meanwhile, others moved toward a more meaning-based notion on internalization,
and some developed directions corresponding to Toomela’s intuitions. For
instance, studies in developmental psychology began exploring various aspects of
the semiotic nature of the development of mind, the various forms of cultural
processes involved, or the dynamics modalities of development, yet depending on
sociocultural structures (Lyra, 2007; Moro & Rodriguez, 1998; Reddy, 2008;
Rodriguez, 2007). In what follows, we show how our work further contributes to
the notion of internalization by building on Toomela’s propositions. We ﬁrst show
how both our work on position exchange and symbolic resources contributes to
our understanding of internalization, before showing how these can be integrated.
Position exchange: Experiences guided by social situations
One recent development that contributes to the internalization/appropriation
debate is position exchange theory (Gillespie, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2012; Martin &
Gillespie, 2010). This is a neo-Meadian theory of how people ‘‘internalize’’ the
perspectives of others so as to build up the dialogicality of the mind. Much research
has shown that the self comprises a wide variety of voices (Hermans & Hermans-
Konopka, 2010), and that the dynamics of the self, especially the stream of con-
sciousness, is characterized by the dialogical tensions between these voices
(Gillespie, 2005). However, the question of how the voices of signiﬁcant others,
and the wider society, ‘‘get inside’’ the psychological functioning of the individual
remains unresolved. The idea of position exchange is an attempt to answer this
question.
Position exchange begins with the idea that society both at a macro level and at
a more micro institutional level, and even the level of routine practices, comprises
numerous diﬀerentiated social positions. A social position is like a role, but, it puts
the emphasis on the social structuring of the situation to drive both thought and
action. For example, the social position of being an employer, a parent, or a
teaching entails a conﬁguration of social demands, constraints, aﬀordances, expect-
ations, and experiences that shape the perspective of the person occupying the
social position. Social positions can also be at a more abstract level, for example,
being in power, being in an ingroup, being in poverty, being a minority, or being
discriminated against. Again, occupying such social positions cultivates within the
individual a distinctive psychological perspective.
The contribution of position exchange is to emphasize the fact that people
routinely move between social positions. Children become parents, employees
become employers, students become teachers, and unemployed become employed.
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These movements can also reverse: people who are employed can become unem-
ployed, sometimes teachers have to learn, and so on. These exchanges of social
position also occur at a micro level, in the exchanges between helping and being
helped, giving and getting, questioning and answering, talking and listening, apol-
ogizing and forgiving, and so on. The interesting thing about these exchanges of
social position is that it provides a mechanism for the layering up of experiences
within the individual in such a way as to create the potential for the dialogicality of
mind. For example, the perspective cultivated while being a child (e.g. ‘‘I’ll never be
like my parents’’) contrasts with perspective cultivated while being a parent (e.g.
demands, responsibilities, and safety concerns). Research has shown how the move
from the social position of not having children to having children creates tensions
due to the layering up of diﬀerent experiences, goals, and orientations (Smith,
1999). Equally, research has shown how doctors who become patients also have
a clash of perspectives, in this case between needing to preserve some emotional
distance from patients and potentially having too much empathy and psychological
involvement (Edelstein & Baider, 1982). The key point of position exchange is that
the doctor internalizes the perspective of patients most directly by being a patient.
The contribution of position exchange to the internalization debate is to remind
us of the importance of the fact that people regularly move between social pos-
itions. This is important because, as much social psychology shows us, people’s
psychological orientation, their perspective, is largely determined by their social
position, that is, the power of the social situation (Ross & Nisbett, 1991).
Accordingly, as people move between social positions they are in eﬀect moving
between psychological orientations. But, while people can move absolutely out of
one social situation and into another, they cannot move so cleanly between the
associated psychological orientations. That is to say movement between social
positions creates a layering up of perspectives within the individual, and it is this
layering up that we can talk about the social structure of society, or even the voices
of society, being internalized.
Symbolic resources: Experiences guided by cultural
artifacts
Another contribution to the internalization debate was proposed with the concept
of symbolic resources (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010; Hale, 2008; Hale & de Abreu,
2010; Muller Mirza, Grossen, de Diesbach-Dolder, & Nicollin, 2014; Zittoun,
2006a, 2007, 2013; Zittoun, Duveen, Gillespie, Ivinson, & Psaltis, 2003).
Symbolic resources refer to complex semiotic artifacts, such as books, ﬁlms, or
songs, used in relation to something that exceeds their intended meaning. When
used as symbolic resources, they ‘‘can thus oﬀer complex forms of semiotic medi-
ation intended to facilitate the apprehension of new events and thoughts’’ (Zittoun,
2006a, p. 61). This concept reveals the diverse forms of sociocultural guidance, and
also, emphasizes the possibility for the emergence of new experiences on the basis
of what is internalized.
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The concept was developed to account for the fact that signs rarely appear in
isolation—one does not only internalize a single sign such as that which allows us
to recognize an apple or to add two numbers. People mostly encounter signs in
more complex semiotic conﬁgurations. In eﬀect, people often say that an important
experience or guide in their lives was a book or a song that changed their lives; also,
people can re-see a movie or re-experience a ﬁlm or song in their material absence,
that is to say, through their mind’s eyes or ears. This suggests that these cultural
artefacts have been, so some extent, internalized. So, how can we account for this?
Cultural elements such as books, ﬁlms, or songs have a relatively stable form,
because of their boundary or frame, and their material or institutional support.
They are made of a complex semiotic conﬁguration of diﬀerent modalities (sound-
based, words, colors) and they demand an imaginary experience. A cultural experi-
ence is thus a semiotically guided imaginary experience—such as watching a ﬁlm or
reading a novel. The semiotic guidance comes from the outside (the colored dots
moving on a screen combined with the soundtrack) yet the experience itself neces-
sarily comes from within the person: a ﬁlm is striking, scary, or romantic,
because the viewer mobilizes his or her personal memories of events or situations
similar to these depicted in the construction of a new experience, an imaginary
experience of what may happen and the associated embodied emotions (Vygotsky,
1971; Zittoun, 2006b).
Such culturally guided experiences are thus orchestrated from outside the
person, but the experiences are inner psychological phenomena. These experiences
can leave a strong impression, can be repeated, and eventually become personal.
People may refer to a movie situation or a book character, or think of a song, to
make sense of a daily situation. These culturally guided imaginary experiences
become, in short, real reference points in the lives of people. In other words,
these are now part of one’s personal culture and can be used a psychological
tools—that is, as symbolic resources.
What has been internalized? One cannot say that one has internalized a book or
a ﬁlm; rather, what has been internalized, is the pattern of experience guided by a
semiotic conﬁguration; only then, a similar experience can be guided from within
(in addition, cultural experiences are also often socially shared in social interactions
(Zittoun, 2010). One can ‘‘hear’’ a song in one’s mind because one’s experience can
be channeled or guided through semiotic conﬁgurations that are comparable to the
initial ones. So ﬁnally, what does this say about internalization? In that respect,
internalization is not putting ‘‘in’’ what has been ‘‘out’’: ﬁrst, semiotic guidance
operates at the boundary of self and the world; and second, it allows guiding one’s
inner ﬂow of experience through semiotic conﬁguration now self-initiated.
Layering up experiences across the lifecourse
The concepts of position exchange and symbolic resources reconceptualize intern-
alization in a comparable way; instead of some external cultural content having to
breach the threshold between outer and inner worlds, it is the person moving
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between social positions and within semiotic guidance that accumulates layers of
experience (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2013). In position exchange, situations cre-
ate experiences, and people are conceptualized as moving between socially pat-
terned experiences. In symbolic resources, cultural artefacts such as books and
ﬁlms create experiences, and people are conceptualized as, ﬁrst, being moved
within these guided experiences, and second, moving between such experiences.
In both cases, there is something external, a situation or a cultural artefact, that
scaﬀolds and guides human experience. In both cases, strictly speaking, there is
nothing that becomes internalized, rather, there is an external world that produces
and guides an experience. The experience is called ‘‘internal’’ because: (1) it is not
accessible to observers, it has private qualia that cannot be captured from an
observers’ perspective and (2) it is the experiential (i.e. internal) side of an encoun-
ter with culture in the form of society or cultural artifacts (i.e. external). Thus, we
would argue, in response to the ﬁrst debate (discussed above), that there is no
necessary problem with the internal/external metaphor provided we do not apply
the metaphor in a simplistic manner.
We have separated position exchange and uses of symbolic resource for analyt-
ical clarity. From a developmental perspective, interactions with semiotic and cul-
tural objects are never independent from socially situated interactions with people.
It is as we interact with others and exchange position that we learn to use cultural
elements and symbolic resources—including language. Moreover, interactions with
others are often mediated by cultural elements. This mutual constitution has been
captured by the prism model of meaning-making described in our previous work
(Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, & Psaltis, 2007). Also, we have retraced the mutual
development of these dynamics in a developmental, recursive model elsewhere
(Zittoun & Gillespie, 2016). In the present article, we are emphasizing how the
combined focus on position exchange and symbolic resources can contribute spe-
ciﬁcally to the internalization debate.
The proposed approach to internalization is interesting because the experiences
which are created, in the various social positions and across the wide diversity of
symbolic resources, are rarely consistent with one another. As these experiences
leave traces within the person, in the accumulation of experiences the individual
becomes a locus of clashing experiences, a clash, that we suggest, underlies much of
our psychological life. For example, each person is a unique space-time trajectory,
and thus a unique combination of experiences, and thus locus of this clash (Mead,
1932). Each person is forced to produce their own, often creative, response to the
contradictions of society; contradictions which the individual embodies through
this layering up of experience that is from society and thus reﬂective of society.
Thus, we argue, in relation to the second debate (discussed above), that the unique
trajectory of each individual through this matrix of social and cultural experiences
ensures that internalization is not mere reproduction, but instead always a creative
process that is interacting with past layers of experience.
People’s life trajectories lead them to move through diverse spheres of experi-
ences, both proximal and distal (Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a, 2015b). Proximal
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experiences are guided by the immediate social environment, social situations they
share with others in speciﬁc material and social locations, for example, being
absorbed in the demands and action of teaching. Distal experiences are discon-
nected from the immediate social setting, they include past proximal experiences
which are mobilized in the present (such as one’s memories of being a student when
teaching oneself) and imaginary experiences, such as vicarious experiences created
by a ﬁlm (such as the ﬁlm Detachment, following a young teacher) (Kaye, 2012).
Thus, at any moment in time and space, a person can be located in one speciﬁc
proximal experience but mobilize a large number of distal experiences. These are
often not discrete, but layered up and, at a psychological level, interacting. Hence,
when teaching, a person might mobilize many teacher-student experiences, as well
as various symbolic resources, now partly fused with personal experiences. In
eﬀect, experiences can be brought through lateral integration from one situation
to another. They can also be more vertically integrated when they become more
abstract or diﬀuse (such as a principle to never judge a student without ﬁrst lis-
tening to his or her account). Of course, as experiences are never homogeneous,
these integrations can be source of tensions. For instance, a teacher might like to
give autonomy to trusted students, but if confronted with a particularly uncoopera-
tive class, the teacher might feel compelled to use authority. Also, some more
speciﬁc past experiences (such as the memory of a conﬂict with a student that
turned into a legal case) might stand out as an emotionally laden event, which
renders more ambivalent the situation and its possible resolutions. These tensions
invite new sense making, occasioning the creation of a new possible answer, using
symbolic resources to imagine alternatives, or prompting a new integration of
experiences. Tensions, ruptures (Zittoun et al., 2003; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2015a),
and Gegenstand (Valsiner, 2014) are the conditions for the emergence of new ideas.
In proposing a model of person, body and mind, moving through situations and
culturally guided experiences, we have tried to demonstrate the necessary layered
nature of mind. What layers up within the individual is not culture per se but rather
experiences patterned by culture. This layered nature opens the space to concep-
tualize movement in mind as the emergence of new ideas, the expression of agency
or subjectivity, or the possibility to enrich the social and cultural environment. It is
this integrative model that we propose to further the concept of internalization –
internalization, not as the simplistic importation of that which was external, but, as
a complex layering up of experiences and responses occasioned by diverse, and
potentially contradictory, social settings and cultural guidance structures.
Conclusion
The notion of internalization plays a key role in cultural psychology; it designates
the core process by which culture becomes mind, and it begins to account for how
mind can create culture. However, its apparent simplicity creates theoretical, epis-
temological, and methodological diﬃculties. In 20 years of Culture & Psychology,
the notion has moved from a general and somewhat simplistic metaphor borrowed
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from translations of Vygotsky’s texts, to a much more articulated concept, partly
through the critical analysis of Toomela in 1996.
More recently, diverse authors have pursued their attempts to analyze more
ﬁnely the dynamics of internalization. To mention only a few, the development of
dialogical approaches, notably through the work of Ivana Markova´, shows the
tensions and dynamic that come to the fore when the person’s dialog with her
environment produces inner dialogs (Bertau, 2007, 2012; Grossen & Salazar Orvig,
2011; Markova´, 2000, 2003). From a perspective nourished by clinical work,
Sergio Salvatore proposes to articulate the social meanings of signs together
with their emotional modes of diﬀusion in mind (Salvatore & Venuleo, 2010;
Salvatore, 2013). Through the development of his dynamic semiotic developmental
approach, Jaan Valsiner theorizes the dynamics by which meaning can be created,
blocked, or diﬀused in mind, for instance through processes of schematization and
pleromatization (Valsiner, 2006, 2014), which allows ﬁne-grained analysis of
internalization. To complement these approaches, other metaphors, such as that
of catalysis, are proposed to analyze the non-causal dynamics by which internal-
ization might bring to new processes (Cabell & Valsiner, 2014). Our own attempt
to develop a dynamic, integrative model of development can be seen as contribu-
tion to a dynamic, situated, developmental understanding of internalization.
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